Coucil Tax Defense

Fill-in-the-boxes Templates that can be used to rebut a Summons or any Charge or Demand based on Statutes.

Coucil Tax Defense

Postby musashi » Thu May 09, 2013 5:58 pm

The Incomparable John Hurst!

By gracious courtesy of a beloved and much respected fellow rebel, the redoubtable and ever generous John Hurst, I can make public his latest defense of non council tax payment. It is presented here in template form and you need only fill in your own details of name and council etc.

As per his usual, much to be admired and emulated legal works, this is a veritable cornucopia of lawful argument, laboriously and creatively researched, confirmed, and laid out in solid workmanlike manner. So, his kind regards and best wishes to all of us.

To stay with John is to ride a juggernaut on an intensive and extensive adventure into la la legal land. It's a terriffic ride - but by God it's good to get to bed afterwards and sleep it off in the cool air of his beatiful Welsh valley.



Dear Chief Executive,
I am writing to inform you that I intend to pursue a claim for damages against you caused by your misconduct in office in failing to make arrangements for the Billing Authority to hear my application for a discount to the amount of Council Tax that I am liable to pay.
This is in contravention of the Common Law and s.13A of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 (as amended by s.76 of the Local Government Act 2003) hereafter referred to as “s.13A”:
“13. A Billing authority’s power to reduce amount of tax payable
(1)Where a person is liable to pay council tax in respect of any chargeable dwelling and any day, the billing authority for the area in which the dwelling is situated may reduce the amount which he is liable to pay as respects the dwelling and the day to such extent as it thinks fit.
(2)The power under subsection (1) above includes power to reduce an amount to nil.
(3)The power under subsection (1) may be exercised in relation to particular cases or by determining a class of case in which liability is to be reduced to an extent provided by the determination”.

This document is intended to be a “letter before claim” in accordance with Annex A of the Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction in pre-action Conduct.
Please note that the purported Court Orders in this case are void and of no effect because they were obtained by corrupt officials whose actions were ultra vires (as described below) per Lord Denning in Pearlman v Governors of Harrow School [1978] 3 WLR 736.
I have brought to your official’s attention, personally and in correspondence, at least ...... reasons why I consider that I have lawful grounds to withhold payment of my portion of the Council Tax, in whole or in part for the last ..... years, 200.....
As you should know, it is a maxim of the Common Law that “Notice to agent is notice to principal”. That is the reason why I consider that you have responsibility. I also draw your attention to s.79 (2) of the Local Government Act 1888:
“79 (2) All duties and liabilities of the inhabitants of a county shall become and be duties and liabilities of the council of such county…”.
This is significant because it confirms that several of the reasons which I have for asking for a discount will also apply to individual councilors and the Council as a public body.
To date, your officials have disregarded S13A. I have not been given the opportunity to have my applications for a discount heard and have been bankrupted and imprisoned without due process. This is unlawful for the following reasons.
The first concerns the general obligation to comply with statutes and to interpret them in accordance with s’s.3 and 12 of the Interpretation Act 1978:
“s. 3 Judicial notice.

Every Act is a public Act to be judicially noticed as such, unless the contrary is expressly provided by the Act....
s.12. Continuity of powers and duties.
(1)Where an Act confers a power or imposes a duty it is implied, unless the contrary intention appears, that the power may be exercised, or the duty is to be performed, from time to time as occasion requires.
(2)Where an Act confers a power or imposes a duty on the holder of an office as such, it is implied, unless the contrary intention appears, that the power may be exercised, or the duty is to be performed, by the holder for the time being of the office...”.
Failing to comply with a statutory or common law obligation is misconduct in office for an official and an offence of Public Nuisance for a private person. It also suspends the laws or the effect of laws contrary to Chapters 39 and 40 of Magna Carta 1215, Section 29 of Magna Carta 1297, Articles 1 and 5 plus the prohibition of Non Obstante in the Bill of Rights 1688 and the Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689:
“Magna Carta 1215.
39. No freeman shall be taken or [and] imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or [and] by the law of the land.
40. To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice....”.
Magna Carta 1297.
XXIX Imprisonment, &c. contrary to Law. Administration of Justice. NO Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor [X1condemn him,] but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right...”.
Bill of Rights 1688
Dispensing Power.
That the pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authority without Consent of Parlyament is illegall.....
Right to petition.
That it is the Right of the Subjects to petition the King and all Commitments and Prosecutions for such Petitioning are Illegal....
Non obstante made void.
Noe Dispensation by Non obstante of or to any Statute or any part thereof shall be allowed but the same shall be held void and of noe effect Except a Dispensation be allowed of in such Statute ......”.
Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689.
And for the avoiding of all Disputes and Questions concerning the Being and Authority of the late Parliament assembled at Westminster the thirteenth day of February one thousand six hundred eighty [X2eight] Wee doe most humbly beseech your Majestyes that it may be enacted And bee it enacted by the King and Queenes most excellent Majestyes by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Commons in this present Parlyament assembled and by authoritie of the same That all and singular the Acts made and enacted in the said Parlyament were and are Laws and Statutes of this Kingdome and as such ought to be reputed taken and obeyed by all the People of this Kingdome....”.
Ignorance of the law is no defence. It is a sacking offence:
“Magna Carta 1215.
Ch. 45. “We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or other officials, only men that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep it well...”.
The Home Office publication “Firearms Law, Guidance to Police” gives instructions about how to deal with applications for firearm certificates, another species of quasi judicial decision making:
“13.6. Chief Officers of police should be mindful of case law (Anderson v Neilans (1940) and Joy v Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway (1966)) which suggests that the chief officer should consider the application firstly “From the standpoint of the applicant rather than from that of a possible objector....”.
There is no sign of this approach being taken in my case.
My position will be that the word “may” in S13A is correctly interpreted to mean that the Billing Authority “must” make a determination on the issue when it is raised per Lord Blackburn in Julius -v- Lord Bishop of Oxford and Another [1880] UKHL 1; (1880) 5 AC 214:
"Though giving a power is prima facie merely enabling the donee to act, and so may not inaccurately be said to be equivalent to saying he may act, yet if the object of giving the power is to enable the donee to effectuate a right, then it is the duty of the donee of the power to exercise the power when those who have the right call upon him so to do. And this is equally the case where the power is given by the word 'may', if the object be clear...".
There are also Human Rights and “Wednesbury Reasonableness” issues to consider that I will elaborate on if necessary.
A further proof that I am entitled to a hearing under s.13A concerns the use of Parliamentary material as an aid to the interpretation of Acts. A Practice Direction was issued after the Pepper v. Hart Judgment in 1992 which confirmed that statutes can only be correctly interpreted by reference to Hansard.
The Grand Committee Report stage was reached on 16th June 2003. At line 216GC Lord Hanningfield and Baroness Hanham sought clarification about the scope of s.13A from Lord Rooker, a sponsor of the Bill. He said:
“We should never give examples; you cannot cover all the cases. The noble Baroness makes a fair point.
Clause 77 inserts a new section 13A into the Local Government Finance Act 1992 giving billing authorities discretion to reduce the amount of tax payable. I do not want to start a row but it was interesting to listen to local government bosses saying that they did not want the flexibility to reduce council tax.
In our 2001 local government White Paper we made clear that we are aiming to devolve more decisions on council tax discounts and exemptions. Allowing more decisions to be made locally will give local government greater flexibility to design policies appropriate to their area and give them the ability to respond to difficult cases which are not covered by the present nationally set council tax discounts and exemptions.
This clause does just that by giving billing authorities power to reduce the council tax for a class of dwellings, for example those affected by flooding in a particular location, or for individual circumstances, for example where there is hardship. The billing authority would, of course, have to act reasonably and would have to justify to its auditors what it had done.
To accept the noble Lord's amendment would remove the possibility of billing authorities granting discounts in individual cases. It suggests that Members of the Committee opposite—I refer only to council tax "bosses" opposite—do not trust local authorities to have that kind of freedom. But we on this side believe that local authorities should have that flexibility.
In the old days when we had rates and rateable values—this did not apply to the poll tax—it was always difficult to get reductions. But I did my bit before I entered another place to encourage people to seek rate rebates and discounts when they lived, for example, near factories and quarries. I dealt with the bureaucracy on their behalf. People obtained those discounts through revaluation. There is enormous scope for the pavement politicians of this country to 218GC exploit the flexibility that I mentioned. Councils may not like that but giving that extra flexibility locally can sometimes assuage people's frustration when they feel as if the council does not care and they cannot get a reduction when it is justified.
I do not say that the flexibility is a panacea, far from it, as the amount of money available is notional. However, people can experience incredible frustration when they believe that their local circumstances are not taken account of. The flexibility to which I referred may let the steam out of the bottle in those cases. As I say, we think that local authorities should have that flexibility but they must use it reasonably. Under the clause, billing authorities will meet the cost of providing discounts. There is no recalculation of revenue support grant. This is a genuine local decision for which billing authorities must pay to meet local demand...”.
There is, I submit, no lawful reason for the ........Billing Authority not to consider my application.
A case with similar facts to mine was considered by the Ombudsman in 2006:

“Report on an investigation into complaint no 05/C/03367 against Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council

27 September 2006

Beverley House, 17 Shipton Road, York YO30 5FZ
Investigation into complaint no 05/C/03367
against Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council
Table of Contents Page
Report Summary 1
Introduction 3
Legal and Administrative Background 3
Investigation 4
Conclusion 5
Report Summary
Local taxation
This report arises because Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council failed to recognise and now will not accept that:

• its power to set the level of Council Tax for empty properties in its area1 is different to and exercised separately from its power to reduce an individual’s liability for Council Tax on a property2;

• it cannot fetter its discretion to reduce an individual’s liability for Council Tax by having a “blanket policy” that it will never allow a reduction;

• it must consider and reach a decision on any individual requests.

In December 2004, using new powers the Council decided that all empty homes in its area should pay the maximum 90% of Council Tax. Mr and Mrs Weaver bought a bungalow in the area shortly before the Council’s decision and renovated it. They experienced hostility from people in the area and decided not to move into the bungalow. When they received the bill for 90% of the Council Tax Mrs Weaver wrote to explain their circumstances and ask for a reduction in the Council Tax. The Council refused saying that the Council had set the maximum discount for empty properties “and does not allow for any individual discretion”.

In the course of my investigation of Mrs Weaver’s complaint the Council has maintained that it does not have to consider individual requests for reductions. Given the case law and legal principles about the duty of public authorities not to fetter their exercise of discretion, the Local Government Ombudsman finds the Council’s stance to be inexplicable and, clearly, maladministration.

The Council must consider and reach a decision on Mrs Weaver’s request and must establish internal arrangements for how such requests will be considered and decided in the future. The Council is free to reach any decision that it considers fit on any request provided that it reaches such a decision properly.

1 Local Government and Finance Act 1992 Section 11A (as amended by Local Government Act 2003 Section 75 & 76)
2 Local Government and Finance Act 1992 Section 13A (as amended by Local Government Act 2003 Section


1. Mrs Weaver complains that the Council has failed to give proper consideration to her request for a reduction in her Council Tax liability.

2. For legal reasons, the names used in this report are not the real names of the people and places concerned3.

3. An officer of the Commission has spoken with Mrs Weaver and has made inquiries of the Council.

4. An opportunity has been given for Mrs Weaver and the Council to comment on a draft of this report.

Legal and Administrative Background

5. Local authorities may reduce the discount on Council Tax for a number of classes of empty properties in their area, from 50%, which formerly applied across England and Wales, to a minimum of 10%4. A council must apply the same level of discount to all empty properties in its area or in a specified part of its area.

6. In addition, local authorities may reduce the amount of Council Tax payable on any dwelling or class of dwellings in its area to any extent which it thinks fit5.

7. Where an authority has discretion it can adopt a policy or guidelines to indicate how it proposes to exercise that discretion. Such policy should be determined by those with proper authority, taking account of the law and local circumstances. However, it must not act in a way which ‘fetters’ the proper exercise of discretion. A policy which effectively eliminates the authority’s consideration of an application or of a class of applicants, will be liable to challenge in the courts. Case law has established that without falling into arbitrariness, decision-makers must remember that a policy is an means of securing a consistent approach to individual cases, each of which is likely to differ from others. “Each case must be considered, therefore, in the light of the policy but not so that the policy determines the outcome.6”

3 Local Government Act 1974, section 30(3)
4 Local Government and Finance Act 1992 section 11A as amended by the Local Government Act 2003
(sections 75 and 76)
5 Local Government and Finance Act1992 as amended S13A
6 R v Hampshire County Council ex parte w [1994] ELR 460 at 476, per Sedley J

8. The Commission for Local Administration in England has issued guidance on good administrative practice7 which includes the following general advice:

“(Councils should) consider any special circumstances of each case as well as the council’s policy so as to determine whether there are exceptional reasons which justify a decision more favourable to the individual customer than what the policy would normally provide. … a council’s policy must not be used as a rigidly applied constraint which prevents the proper consideration of any exceptional circumstances of a case. Where the council has a discretion to confer a benefit it is inappropriate to operate a policy which purports to specify in advance circumstances where the discretion will never be exercised. A council which operates in that way would be fettering its discretion.”


9. In December 2004, the Council resolved to reduce the discount on Council Tax for empty properties in its area to 10%. Mr and Mrs Weaver, who live in a different council’s area, had bought a bungalow in Redcar shortly before the Council’s decision. The bungalow needed extensive renovation which Mr and Mrs Weaver carried out in advance of their intended move. However, they were dissuaded from making the move by hostility directed against them from people in the neighbourhood including incidents to which the police were called. They have now put the bungalow on the market.

10. On receiving a Council Tax bill for 90% of the full amount, Mrs Weaver wrote to the Council, outlining her circumstances and the reason why the property was empty. She asked the Council to reduce the amount of tax which it was demanding. The Council replied, saying that, whilst sympathetic, it was unable to reduce the bill as the decision to set the empty property discount at 10% had been taken at policy level “and does not allow for any individual discretion”.

11. In reply to queries from the Commission’s officer, the Council said:

• that it had decided to impose a blanket increase in Council Tax liability on empty properties to encourage their owners to bring them into use;

• that the policy did not allow for the exercise of discretion in individual cases and that, were it to do so, the Council could anticipate applications for relief from the owners of all the 350-plus empty properties in its area

• any similar requests in future would be refused.

7 Guidance on Good Practice 2: Good Administrative Practice 5 05c03367

12. The Commission’s officer then raised with the Council the issue that it might be fettering its discretion, contrary to law. In reply, the Chief Executive said that:

• he did not consider that the Council had fettered its discretion and was “not acting unreasonably as all customers will be treated the same”;

• future requests for amendments to Council Tax charges would not be dismissed out of hand and would be considered by the administrative machinery within the relevant department, although it was most likely that such requests would be refused;

• the Council would recognise instances where requests were based on extraordinary circumstances and would act accordingly. However there appeared to be no such circumstances to justify a different decision in Mrs Weaver’s case; and

• the Council would welcome my advice on the matter.

13. In response to a draft of this report, the Council said that its position was that:

• in respect of its power to reduce the discount on empty properties, it was not necessary to “apply discretion” in individual cases;

• the discretion to reduce Council Tax payments generally is a power, not a duty and the Council “may decide not to use this power” especially where to do so would mean making payments out of local funds;

• the Council believes it should be able to take account of financial constraints “in deciding whether and to what extent discretion to reduce Council Tax payments would be applied”.

14. The Council has drawn attention to court cases where there appears to have been an acceptance that authorities’ general policies left ‘only a small degree of room for discretion’.

15. Statistics produced by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in answer to a Parliamentary Question by the Shadow Local Government Minister revealed that 20 local authorities had confirmed that they either used or planned to use the discretionary power to reduce Council Tax between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2005.


16. The Council argued that it had no discretion to consider or comply with Mrs Weaver’s request and failed to take into account the legislation which enables it to reduce Council Tax on any dwelling as it thinks fit.
6 05c03367
17. Parliament has given the Council powers to reduce Council Tax payments at discretion. It must therefore give proper consideration to any application made to it for such a reduction.

18. The Council’s response to Mrs Weaver clearly was a fettering of its discretion and was certainly maladministration. The injustice to Mrs Weaver was that her own particular circumstances were not properly taken into account.

19. To remedy that injustice, the Council should now give proper consideration to Mrs Weaver’s request. It should invite her to state her reasons as to why her Council Tax payments should be reduced as an exception to the generally applicable level.

Having considered her reasons, the Council should then state its reasons for either accepting or rejecting the application. It should notify me that it has done so, within one month of its formal consideration of this report. It should also confirm that it will establish internal arrangements for how any other requests will be considered and decided in the future, taking into account the relevant law and the proper exercise of its discretion. It should inform me of those arrangements within one month of its formal consideration of this report.

Anne Seex
Local Government Ombudsman
Beverley House
17 Shipton Road
27 September 2006
YO30 5FZ...”.

Now consider this:

Law Society Gazette.

Bankruptcy proceedings and debt collection

Thursday 18 November 2010 by Neil Hickman

In Everitt v Budhram [2010] Ch 1070, Mrs Budhram had been made bankrupt in 2006 for non-payment of £13,130 council tax. She paid the outstanding tax and the petitioning creditor’s costs, but steadfastly failed to engage with the trustee in bankruptcy, and ultimately in 2009, the trustee sought an order for sale of her home.

Deputy District Judge Sommerville refused the order. He said: ‘I always have reservations about using bankruptcy proceedings as a means of debt collection.’

Mr Justice Henderson allowed the trustee’s appeal. He held that the circumstances of the original bankruptcy order could not be taken into account on an application for an order for sale, and drew attention to the well-known authority of Griffin v Wakefield BC [2000] RVR 226 in which the Court of Appeal held that as statute and regulations permitted a local authority to use bankruptcy proceedings to recover council tax debts, there could be no objection in principle to the council doing so.

Does this mean that local authorities may confidently resort to bankruptcy proceedings as a routine method of debt collection? While plainly, as the appeal court held in Griffin, it is acceptable in principle for local authorities to use bankruptcy proceedings, there are good reasons for caution.

Ford v Wolverhampton City Council [2008] BPIR 1304 is a decision of the Local Government Ombudsman. Mr Ford (not his real name) was bankrupted for failure – or refusal – to pay council tax of £1,105. By the time the ombudsman considered his case, the costs of the bankruptcy had reached some £38,000.

Mr Ford insisted to the ombudsman, as he had to the council, that he did not owe £750 in council tax at the time of the order, but the ombudsman found that assertion to be groundless. And although Mr Ford might well have been entitled to council tax benefit, he had failed to co-operate with the claim process.

However, the ombudsman considered that he was entitled to consider Mr Ford’s complaint even though court proceedings had ensued, because he was looking at the decision to take and pursue proceedings, rather than purporting to second-guess the court. He entertained the complaint even though it related to matters which had occurred more than a year previously. And he held that the council had not followed due process in making Mr Ford bankrupt; it had failed to give him adequate warning of the consequences of bankruptcy, and had failed properly to consider the alternative of seeking a charging order against Mr Ford’s home.

The ombudsman found that had such failings not occurred, Mr Ford would have made an offer of repayment to the council prior to the commencement of proceedings. The consequences for the council were financially horrendous; it was recommended to pay for the annulment of Mr Ford’s bankruptcy, save for the £1,150 which he in fact owed.

This decision was robustly applied by District Judge Gordon Ashton in Hunt v Fylde BC [2008] BPIR 1368. The unfortunate Mr Hunt suffered from Huntington’s disease and had as a result withdrawn from the world and adopted an aggressive response to any attempt to assist; a social worker who had attempted to discuss matters with him had simply been asked to leave.

There is no suggestion that Fylde had actually known about Mr Hunt’s condition – but that, said District Judge Ashton, was not the point. The council’s evidence, he observed, ‘…conspicuously failed to advise the court of the procedures adopted by the council for making the discretionary decision that bankruptcy proceedings were appropriate. There is no indication that the council had any information about Mr Hunt before the issue of the petition or even sought such information.’

District Judge Ashton drew attention to rules 7.43 and 7.44 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, which deal with mental and physical disability. He held that the court could invoke these provisions on its own initiative, and went on to conclude that it was important that the court inquired as to whether Mr Hunt should have had a representative. If one had been appointed this might have ensured that the debt was paid or secured to the satisfaction of the petitioning creditor, perhaps involving an application to the Court of Protection, the bankruptcy proceedings being stayed for this purpose.

He pointed out that the onus cannot lie on the debtor to establish lack of capacity, either mental or physical, because lack of capacity would itself render the debtor unable to do so. As Lord Justice Kennedy said in Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2002] EWCA Civ 1889, ‘… courts should always, as a matter of practice, at the first convenient opportunity, investigate the question of capacity whenever there is any reason to ­suspect that it may be absent (for example, significant head injury) …’

Annulling the bankruptcy order, District Judge Ashton pointedly invited Fylde to consider whether, in the light of the Wolverhampton case, it was appropriate to proceed.

This, of course, is a decision of a district judge at first instance, but it is a decision of a judge to whose ‘unrivaled experience’ in this field the High Court in VAC v JAD & Ors [2010] EWHC 2159 (Ch) has recently paid warm tribute.

The ombudsman took a similar approach in Re Exeter City Council [2009] BPIR 598, where the debtor was terminally ill and incapable of dealing with her affairs, though this is an unsurprising decision given that apparently the debtor had actually informed the council of her terminal illness in 2001. Once again, the council found itself paying the costs of the bankruptcy as the price of an annulment. This is going to be the normal situation – Butterworth v Souter [2000] BPIR 582.

District Judge Ashton’s view in Hunt is consistent with the stance of the European Court of Human Rights in Zehentner v Austria [2009] ECHR 1119, a decision recently cited without disapproval by the Supreme Court in Pinnock v Manchester CC [2010] UKSC 45. Lonergan v Gedling BC [2009] EWCA Civ 1569 (an application for permission for a second appeal where Mr Justice Lewison had said that ‘the decision to present the petition was not on the facts an unreasonable one’) is distinguishable on its facts.

The principal difficulty in Everitt was that the court got to grips with the issues so late in the day, after such a large bill in costs had been run up. The court has a discretion to ­dismiss a bankruptcy petition if the debtor secures the debt to the court’s satisfaction (section 271(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986), and surely a well-advised debtor will be willing to submit to a charging order. If the debtor attends the hearing of the petition (which Mrs Budhram did not) the court’s duty to put the parties on an equal footing may oblige the judge to suggest the idea to the parties.

District Judge Neil Hickman sits at Milton Keynes County Court. He is general editor of Civil Court Service (Jordans)....”.

And also consider this:
“ Since Butterworth v Soutter [2000] BPIR 582 and, more recently, Thornhill v. Atherton,
trustees have been incurring costs in administering the estate and making realisations
relatively safe in the knowledge that, in the event of an annulment under s.282(1)(a) of the
Act, on the basis that the order ought not to have been made, then someone would end up
bearing the trustee’s costs, either the petitioning creditor or the debtor. However, the recent
case of Ella v. Ella has taken away the prospect of such an unquestioning indemnity. And,
with the recent council tax cases giving rise to annulments, it is now incumbent upon a
trustee, at least, to conduct some investigation as to the status of the bankruptcy order...".
The same principle applies to you personally.
The Human Rights implications of my case should also have been detected by ................... Council. Note that there is no inconsistency in my objections to funding EU institutions because the correct title is the “European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. The “Fundamental Freedoms” were added as a result of contribution from British lawyers and are provably equivalent to the traditional British “Liberties”.
There is more but this letter is meant to be a concise summary.
I trust that you will concede that the Bankruptcy action against me was ultra vires because the billing Authority had not dealt with my application for a discount before going to Court.
Because you are personally liable for the ultra vires actions of your subordinates, I require you to take steps to annul my Bankruptcy within 14 days per the Ombudsman’s directions and the Ford v Wolverhampton City Council Judgment. There is the question of whether special or exemplary damages apply.
I require you to make arrangements for the matter of my application for a discount to be lawfully dealt with. As noted above, I submit that this should be done by the full Council in public.
I require copies of all correspondence relating to me which is in your possession. Consider this to be an application under the Freedom of Information legislation. Take the £10 fee out of the money you owe me.
I remind you of the court's powers to impose sanctions for failure to comply with this Practice Direction.
I remind you that ignoring this letter before claim may lead to me starting proceedings and may increase your liability for costs.
Yours sincerely,
It's still fucked, isn't it?
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Re: Coucil Tax Defense

Postby wanabfree » Sat May 11, 2013 5:20 am

The letter begins with,

“Dear Chief Executive,
I am writing to inform you that I intend to pursue a claim for damages against you caused by your misconduct in office in failing to make arrangements for the Billing Authority to hear my application for a discount to the amount of Council Tax that I am liable to pay.
This is in contravention of the Common Law and s.13A of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 (as amended by s.76 of the Local Government Act 2003) hereafter referred to as “s.13A”...”

What damages? How have you honestly suffered any “damage”?

You then use the term “to the amount of Council Tax that I am liable to pay”. What facts has the council presented to prove you or anyone else for that matter has such a “liability”?

Based on these statements alone you have already lost any standing you may have had to even bring such a claim, which you could never have anyways.

Sorry but after reading that, there is no point in continuing to read the rest, because this is preaching to arguments that have time and time again been proven flawed.

I know clearly a lot of work and effort went into this letter, but you’re waiting your time using or relying on such things.

Your playing right into their hands especially when quoting legislation as well, a big no no in my book, because by doing so your acknowledging there must be some validity to their statutes, which the facts prove there isn’t.

You’re better off just asking them to produce evidence based on just one question.

“What facts do you rely on to prove the Act (local Government Finance Act) is applicable to me?”

That’s all you need to write to them about, don’t take any position other than your willing to pay upon the council presenting the facts an obligation exists, not based on their opinions or anyone else’s, but based on tangible and objective evidence.
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Re: Coucil Tax Defense

Postby musashi » Sat May 11, 2013 10:28 am

For the wise man, a single glance is enough; for the ignorant man, a thousand books will not suffice.
The question is; which one are you? I know.
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Re: Coucil Tax Defense

Postby treeman » Sun May 12, 2013 11:41 am

Does this qualify as a success.

This article is a Follow up to the court case I won against Waltham Forest proving that the SPD (Single Person Discount Form) was fraudulent and you do not have to fill it in. See article: Council lose court case over SPD form.

I was also allowed opportunity to counterclaim and the council were denied costs. There is a further counterclaim in the recent correspondence over this latest fraud.

As stated in the article Waltham Forest council brought up an amount at the first court date which was not part of the summons and committed perjury by stating it was from 2006. (All this is explained in the correspondence below).

Elaine Logan acting on behalf of Waltham Forest is now party to the fraud. Below is the correspondence I sent.

Elaine Logan also stated that my statutory declaration was a "letter" and stated it was received on the 20th, it was in fact stamped by a barrister on the 22nd and delivered by hand and a receipt obtained on the 25th when it was delivered.

Lies, obsfucation and fraud are now all normal practice for administrative drones in the public sector. This has been brought in by trained "change agents" and Common Purpose type training.

It is however worth confronting them with their misconduct in public office and making sure they know they are personally liable.

I also issued a public notice of Estoppel and notice to Newlyn debt collectors who have been handed the false financial instrument fraudulently by Elaine Logan acting on behalf of LBWF.

Here is my response:

To: Elaine Logan

Acting on behalf of

London Borough of Waltham Forest

Ref: 008

Date: 22/4/13

Re: Letter dated 9th April 2013

Re: Untrue statements made by Elaine Logan on behalf of LBWF, misconduct in public office and being party to fraud on behalf of LBWF. Ignoring a legal document and obfuscating facts by deliberate and willful deception through issuing unlawful proceedings and being party to fraudulent financial instruments.

Statement of fact:

Elaine Logan states: “I refer to the contents of your letter that reached my office 20th Feb 2013 regarding your council tax account, the contents of which have been noted. Please accept my apologies for the delay in responding”.

The document referred to was not a letter. The legal document, a statutory declaration was witnessed, stamped by a barrister and dated 22nd Feb and reached your office on 25th. A stamped receipt dated 25th Feb was obtained from a member of staff for LBWF as the document was served by hand.

The above statement by Elaine Logan is therefore untrue.

There is no evidence that Elaine Logan did not ignore this legal document and was not party to deceptive practice and untrue statements in the above quoted letter and it is believed that none exists.

Elaine Logan states: “A hearing date 10th Jan 2013 at Thames magistrates court has been withdrawn and all associated costs”.

This is an untrue statement. LBWF issued vexatious proceedings on assumption through negligence and fraud. Despite all relevant parties at LBWF being served documentation in good time and also given five chances to remedy (creating five more counts of fraud in this case) they chose to carry on with a false assumption rather than act on the factual information provided.

The Bulk hearing on the 10th Jan became the case heard on 1st Feb because the magistrate ordered a hearing following information being presented which proved LBWF had failed to address the facts through deliberate fraud and deception.

The hearing on 1st Feb was for the counterclaim brought by myself and upheld against LBWF. If the hearing on 10th Jan had been “withdrawn”, the perjury committed by LBWF and the false amount claimed by yourself on behalf of LBWF which was not part of the summons amount would have no standing according to your own assumptions. This is an untrue and contradictory statement by Elaine Logan.

At the hearing on 1st Feb LBWF council lost the case and were denied costs. LBWF committed fraud, perjury and were found to be in contempt of court at the hearing on 10th Jan and also at the case being heard by the district judge on 1st Feb.

The counter claim against Waltham Forest was upheld by the judge and can be heard in County Court if the outstanding amount of £2,600 pounds is not settled forthwith. This amount is separate from the amount stated below which will form the basis of this particular claim.

Elaine Logan states: “Council tax records show Liability order 117157 was issued against you at Waltham Forest Magistrates court on 19th October2009.”

As stated in the statutory declaration referred to above (enclosed), no liability order was made for any of the amounts claimed (the amounts so far have changed three times, see below).

The law states that Liability orders for council tax last for one year from date of issue.

The legal determination made by Elaine Logan is therefore false and has no standing. Any further correspondence from Elaine Logan must disclose whether or not she is legally qualified.

As there was no liability order issued there is no evidence that Elaine Logan has not made incorrect legal determinations.

There is no evidence that the above statements are not false, fraudulent and evidence of misconduct in public office and it is believed that none exists. Any legally qualified third party adviser to Elaine Logan is also implicated in this matter.

The letter to which you refer from Mrs T Denham dated 2nd Jan:

Statement of fact:

Daniel Fenwick (Head of legal services) had failed to respond to the legally correct assumption of fraud by LBWF and failed to respond at all. This negligence wasted the time of the courts, myself and council tax payers money.

Daniel Fenwick having been served with all relevant facts had thereby formed tacit agreement with all known facts by non response

The response from “Your colleague“, Mrs T Denham Revenue Services Manager dated 2nd Jan 2013 and received on the 9th Jan, the day before the hearing failed to address all points and made statements which were untrue and contradictory regarding contract, council tax, liquidated damages and the 1992 Local Government finance Act. All assumptions in this correspondence were incorrect.

The letter refers to an amount of £548.33 which was not owed and was not the subject of any known liability order. The amount now as stated by yourself is, £508.88. The amount you stated was on a “liability order” is £475.

There is clearly no accounting for this amount and there was never a liability order for this amount which you assumed to be from 2009, yet the court presenting officer stated was from 2006, this as stated had nothing to do with the hearing or the summons amount on the 10th Jan. This did however amount to perjury by LBWF as stated in the statutory declaration which has been ignored by LBWF and yourself and deceptively described by yourself as a letter.

There is no evidence Mrs T Denham was not in dereliction of duty as a public servant, party to fraud and misconduct in public office and it is believed that none exists.

Mrs T Denham having failed to address all points was party to vexatious and entirely unnecessary court proceedings which the council lost and were denied costs. The judge stated on 1st Feb 2013 that the counterclaim made by myself against LBWF unless settled in full can heard in The County Court.

Re: Elaine Logan having instigated bailiff proceedings for monies not owed and with no legal standing.

There is no evidence that Elaine Logan has not acted fraudulently in public office and intentionally and vexatiously caused distress, issued unlawful proceedings with no standing and issued false instruments in public office and it is believed that none exists.

Newlyn debt collection will now also be acting as third party to the above stated fraud by attempting to obtain money knowingly or unknowingly by deception with no legal standing as third party interloper in the matter.

There is no evidence Elaine Logan is not solely responsible for this Involvement of a third party interloper acting with no lawful standing in the matter and it is believed that none exists.

London Borough of Waltham Forest are now liable for three times the amount

stated in the letter above of £508.88.

The outstanding amount owed by LBWF is therefore £1,526.64.

Elaine Logan is also solely responsible for transferring a fraudulent financial instrument to Newlyn Debt Collectors who are now knowingly or unknowingly party to the fraud. Elaine Logan will be solely responsible for any correspondence by mail, phone or visits from any third party interlopers pursuing this false claim on behalf of Elaine Logan. Elaine Logan will be personally liable for any time and costs incurred in dealing with this matter.

The above information is now in the public domain and can be used in any form in any medium in any part of the world without prior notice.

Notice of Estoppel:

To: Elaine Logan

Acting on behalf of

London Borough of Waltham Forest



Ref: 008

Your Ref: Elaine Logan 9/4/13

Re: False claims for amount(s) described in the document attached following LBWF losing court case 1st Feb 2013.

Describing the existence of a false financial instrument. Making false claims and obfuscating only known facts for financial gain.

You have been stopped. You are hereby formally noticed by this public notice of estoppel with regard to your incorrect and unlawful actions and false claims in your letter dated 9th April 2013. The statement of facts and statutory declaration served with this document contain the only known facts in this matter.

Elaine Logan on behalf of LBWF having been party to unlawful and fraudulent financial instruments and untrue claims are hereby stopped in their unlawful claims.

Any third party interloper acting on behalf of LBWF and Elaine Logan is also hereby noticed that their actions are unlawful and without equitable standing in this matter.

Respondents are also prevented from denying the existence of the counter claim plus costs which is now over due for payment and protected by the bills of exchange act.

From my Statutory declaration:

Statutory Declaration

Re: Council document : “Impending enforcement action” vexatiously issued by LBWF after losing court case and being denied costs against myself on 1st /2nd /13.

There was no liability order granted against myself at a Magistrates Court on 19/10/2009. There was no accounting or evidence for an amount claimed of £474.

Evidence of a Magistrates Court liability order was requested by myself but never received in 2009. The Council document “Notice of Impending enforcement action” is therefore not a vaild document and has no legal standing.

Following the council issuing an incorrect summons for monies not owed on 10th Jan 2013 the council presenting officer Alistair Clarke committed perjury by bringing up an incorrect amount not owed or part of the summons amount. Mr. Clarke stated the amount was from 2006 which was untrue, this clearly was a reference to the above amount.

The magistrate ordered an adjournment until 1st Feb as the council had not filed a defence to my counterclaim or produced any of the filed documents served on them.

On 1st Feb London Borough of Waltham Forest lost the case for the summons amount against myself and were denied costs. The judge stated the counterclaim by myself was vaild and could be heard upon request at The County Court.

Any third party requesting payment for the amount stated, £474 will be acting fraudulently on behalf of LBWF. Any action taken by LBWF against myself will be considered harrassment and reasonable fees will be added to the counterclaim.

I make this solemn declaration believing the same to be true and by virtue of the

Statutory Declarations Act 1835

Here is my notice to Newlyn Debt collectors

To Cheryl Vickers

c/o Newlyn PLC

Notice to: Newlyn PLC

This matter is in the public domain

Re: A false financial instrument issued by London Borough of Waltham Forest.

Please read the enclosed documentation. Elaine Logan acting on behalf of LBWF council may have passed a fraudulent financial instrument to your company through their Council Tax department. The false claim of a liability order by LBWF is outlined in detail.

LBWF committed fraud, perjury and were in contempt of court and have vexatiously issued a fraudulent claim against myself. LBWF lost a court case and were denied costs against myself at Thames County Court on 1st Feb. The judge also ruled that a counterclaim by myself could be heard in The County Court.

The details of this are outlined in the enclosed correspondence. A statutory declaration is also enclosed.

The case can be viewed online at in the article “Latest: Council lose court case over SPD validation form”.

Please be aware that there may be a counterclaim against you personally in the County Court if there is any attempted enforcement through fraudulent financial instruments issued on behalf of your company acting as third party to Elaine Logan acting on behalf of LBWF.

Please do not respond with a standard letter stating that a legitimate debt has been passed on to you for collection, as this is untrue. There is no outstanding debt or liability order. Any response will be considered to be in the public domain and published as stated at the end of this notice. I hope this clarifies matters

The above information is now in the public domain and can be used in any form, in any medium, in any part of the world without prior notice.

Conclusion: When councils blatantly lie and they resort to this do let whoever corresponds with you know that they are PERSONALLY liable!
I'll make no subscription to their paradise.

All Rights Reserved - Without Prejudice - Without Recourse - Non-Assumpsit
Errors & Omissions Excepted
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Re: Coucil Tax Defense

Postby musashi » Sun May 12, 2013 11:58 am

As Gandalf said tio the fellowship outside the Gates of Moria: "I have no counsel for the despairing."

It's still fucked, isn't it?
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